Jorgensen v. Coppedge Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 35575 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
4-15-2009
Jorgensen v. Coppedge Appellant's Reply Brief
Dckt. 35575
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Jorgensen v. Coppedge Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 35575" (2009). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 2211.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/2211
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
BRIAN JORGENSEN d.b.a. MEDICINE 
MAN PHARMACY and MEDICINE MAN 
PHARMACY, INC., and Idaho corporation, 
Respondents, 
vs. 
C. MICHAEL COPPEDGE and KAREN 
COPPEDGE, individually and as the last 
Board of Directors and shareholders of 
Acology Prescription Compounding, Inc, and 
A CO LOGY PRESCRIPTION 
COMPOUNDING, INC. a dissolved Idaho 
corporation, 
Appellants 
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APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District 
of the State ofldaho in and for the County of Bonner 
Honorable Jolm T. Mitchell, presiding 
Charles R. Dean, Jr. ISB# 5763 
Dean&Kolts 
1110 West Park Place, Suite 212 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83 814 
(208) 664-7794/(208) 664-9844 FAX 
Attorneys for Appellants 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
(208) 667-0683/(208) 664-1684 FAX 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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INTRODUCTION 
Respondents (collectively "plaintiffs") present arguments in their Response Brief that are 
either not supported by law or are inconsistent with the actual record of what took place in the 
trial court. Plaintiffs also completely ignore the fact that had they were the ones who convinced 
the trial court to deny the Coppedges challenge to the restrictive covenant at issue and that no 
trial would have taken place on either their complaint or the Coppedges counterclaim had they 
not advocated what this Court found to be an inaccurate legal position. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The Coppedges Are Entitled To Fees As A Matter of Right. 
Plaintiffs' recitation of the law relating to the Coppedges' entitlement to an award of 
attorneys' fees is incomplete. Plaintiffs cite cases like Israel v. Leachman, 139 Idaho 24 (2003) 
and Ramco v. H-K Contractors, Inc, 118 Idaho 108 (1990) for the obvious and uncontroverted 
propositions that a trial court can, in the proper exercise of its discretion, find that neither party 
prevailed or, under proper circumstances, that each party prevailed in part. 
A trial court does not, however, have unbridled discretion to simply deny a party fees 
because it believes doing so is the fair thing to do. As supported in the Coppedges Opening 
Brief, once the trial court decides that the case is one in which the award of fees is authorized 
and makes the discretionary determination under IRCP 54( d)(l )(B) that a party prevailed for the 
purposes of the award of costs, that party is entitled to an award of fees in an amount the trial 
court believes is reasonable after weighing the factors outlines in IRCP 54( e )(3). 
Here, the trial court unequivocally concluded that the Coppedges were entitled to recover 
their costs "as a matter of right" (LTr 18, L 4; LR 78). The Coppedges were thus entitled to an 
analysis of their fees request under IRCP 54(e)(3). The trial court, however, refused to do so, 
stating instead that it had the discretion to deny fees altogether. Though the trial court recited 
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that it was doing so, at least in part, based upon the assertion neither party prevailed ( one wholly 
inconsistent with its award of costs), the record is clear that the trial court was impermissibly 
imposing its own sense of justice instead of following the law. 
B. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion In Finding Neither Party Prevailed. 
The trial court made the inconsistent finding that the Coppedges were the prevailing 
parties for the purposes of costs but that neither party prevailed for the purpose of fees. Aside 
from that error, the trial court would have abused its discretion if it had consistently found 
neither party prevailed. 
Plaintiffs curiously cite the case of Shore v. Peterson, 2009-ID-0306.117, a case decided 
after the Coppedges brief was filed, in support of their arguments. The holding in that case, 
however, fully supports the fact that the Coppedges were the prevailing parties, virtually as a 
matter of Jaw. In Shore, the defendant raised the affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction 
to an action on a promissory note. In the alternative, the defendant asked in a counterclaim for 
damages as a result of the alleged conversion of the tools and equipment he identified as the 
consideration for the accord and satisfaction. The trial court accepted defendant's affirmative 
defense and therefore ruled that his obligations under the note had been satisfied. That decision 
rendered the counterclaim moot and the trial court accordingly ruled in favor of the plaintiff on 
the defendant's conversion cause of action. The trial court then denied the defendant costs and 
attorney's fees on the theory that neither party prevailed. 
This Court reversed, holding that the defendant in Shore was the prevailing party and that 
the trial court thus abused its discretion. In so finding, this Court noted (a) that the defendant had 
prevailed on the "primary issue" in the case (i.e. the claim on the promissory note) and (b) that 
the counterclaim was simply an "alternative" to the defendant's defense of accord and 
satisfaction (Id. at I 6). 
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What occurred in this case is virtually identical. Plaintiffs filed an action seeking to 
recover monetary damages based on the contract this Court addressed in its prior decision. That 
claim was the "primary issue" in the case since clearly the Coppedges (who lived in Florida) had 
washed their hands of the Plaintiffs. The Copp edges principal defense to that claim was the 
covenant as advocated by plaintiffs was a disguised, unenforceable covenant not to compete. In 
the "alternative", the Coppedges asserted by way of counterclaim that the plaintiffs were in 
breach of a reciprocal covenant not to compete. 
The only difference between the Shore case and the Coppedges is that the trial court did 
not rule in the Coppedges favor on their principal defense. Had it done so, the case would have 
been over. No dispute exists as to the fact that the Coppedges had paid every penny arguably 
due under the contract as of the date they closed operations in Coeur d'Alene and, as this Court 
has already noted in its previous decision, the Coppedges defense applied to their counterclaim. 
A ruling in the Coppedges favor by the trial court on their defense would thus mean that any 
claim they had against plaintiffs based on their breach of the reciprocal covenant was similarly 
unenforceable. The result would accordingly have the same effect as the trial court's favorable 
ruling in Shore. 
C. The Coppedges Cannot Be Blamed Or Punished For Not Presenting Their 
Defense In A Pre-Trial Motion. 
Plaintiffs convinced the trial court that the Coppedges should be blamed and thus 
punished for not bringing the issue of the enforceability the covenant they were advocating 
before the Court in a motion for summary judgment on the speculative claim that the trial court 
might have ruled otherwise than it did. Aside from fruitlessness of doing so until plaintiffs 
conceded no franchise relationship existed, plaintiffs lose sight of what really happened. 
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If they did not appreciate the issue on their own (something they had many years to do 
given the early settlement efforts of the parties), the Coppedges' arguments and supporting 
authorities were presented to them in the Coppedges trial brief a week before trial. Plaintiffs not 
only had that week to analyze the issue, but was given several additional days after the trial 
began by the trial court to submit written opposition. They did so, arguing strenuously against 
the Coppedges defense. The trial court, with written briefing from both sides and argument from 
counsel, then took several additional days to rule against the Coppedges. In doing so, the trial 
court did not even recognize the contractual provision at issue as a covenant not to compete. 
Instead, it accepted the plaintiffs' argument that the covenant was simply a payment term for the 
consideration the Coppedges were supposedly receiving under the contract. 
Arguing, as the plaintiffs did, that the Coppedges were at fault and thus should be denied 
their fees when plaintiffs themselves had more than sufficient time to analyze the issue and 
acknowledge to the trial court the correctness of the Coppedges position is perplexing at best. 
That the trial court accepted and applied that argument to deprive the Coppedges of fees is, 
however, reversible. Otherwise, every litigant who does not bring up legal issues before the trial 
court in a motion for summary judgment or partial summary judgment ( even if denial was certain 
because factual issues existed) would run the risk of being denied the award oflegal fees if trial 
court then fails to analyze the law correctly. Not one case in the jurisprudence of this state 
begins to support such a notion. 
A. The Coppedges Are Entitled At The Very Least To Their Post-Trial Fees. 
The Coppedges' counterclaim and the timing of their arguments about the enforceability 
of the covenant plaintiffs were seeking to enforce had nothing to do with what occurred after the 
verdict was rendered. Over the conrse of the next year and a half, plaintiffs aggressively pursued 
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two new trial motions, sought to be awarded attorneys' fees and prejudgment interest and, after 
securing an order for a new trial, argued strenuously that the jury's verdict of liability should be 
recognized and the new trial should be on the issue of damages only (i.e. that they should get a 
second bite because their first, overreaching tactic at trial had backfired) (R 221-364). Not once 
during the numerous court appearances or the numerous, multi-page briefs was any aspect of the 
Coppedges' counterclaim addressed, pursued, argued or involved. 
The entire time they were pursuing those efforts to reargue damages without having to 
face the Coppedges' defense again, plaintiffs had the ability (and the responsibility) to reassess 
the validity and enforceability of the position they were advocating. They did not do that and 
that failure caused the Coppedges thousands of dollars in additional fees that under no 
conceivable theory had any relationship to the issues the pursued in their counterclaim. The trial 
court nevertheless refused to even consider apportioning fees between those incurred pre-verdict 
and those incurred afterwards in pure defense of plaintiffs' pursuit of damages. 
Dated: April 10, 2009 Dean & olts 
Charles R. Dean, Jr. 
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